A Guide to Undefined Behavior in C and C++, Part 1: "
Programming languages typically make a distinction between normal program actions and erroneous actions. For Turing-complete languages we cannot reliably decide offline whether a program has the potential to execute an error; we have to just run it and see.
In a safe programming language, errors are trapped as they happen. Java, for example, is largely safe via its exception system. In an unsafe programming language, errors are not trapped. Rather, after executing an erroneous operation the program keeps going, but in a silently faulty way that may have observable consequences later on. Luca Cardelli’s article on type systems has a nice clear introduction to these issues. C and C++ are unsafe in a strong sense: executing an erroneous operation causes the entire program to be meaningless, as opposed to just the erroneous operation having an unpredictable result. In these languages erroneous operations are said to have undefined behavior.
The C FAQ defines “undefined behavior” like this:
Anything at all can happen; the Standard imposes no requirements. The program may fail to compile, or it may execute incorrectly (either crashing or silently generating incorrect results), or it may fortuitously do exactly what the programmer intended.
This is a good summary. Pretty much every C and C++ programmer understands that accessing a null pointer and dividing by zero are erroneous actions. On the other hand, the full implications of undefined behavior and its interactions with aggressive compilers are not well-appreciated. This post explores these topics.
A Model for Undefined Behavior
For now, we can ignore the existence of compilers. There is only the “C implementation” which — if the implementation conforms to the C standard — acts the same as the “C abstract machine” when executing a conforming program. The C abstract machine is a simple interpreter for C that is described in the C standard. We can use it to determine the meaning of any C program.
The execution of a program consists of simple steps such as adding two numbers or jumping to a label. If every step in the execution of a program has defined behavior, then the entire execution is well-defined. Note that even well-defined executions may not have a unique result due to unspecified and implementation-defined behavior; we’ll ignore both of these here.
If any step in a program’s execution has undefined behavior, then the entire execution is without meaning. This is important: it’s not that evaluating (1<<32) has an unpredictable result, but rather that the entire execution of a program that evaluates this expression is meaningless. Also, it’s not that the execution is meaningful up to the point where undefined behavior happens: the bad effects can actually precede the undefined operation.
As a quick example let’s take this program:
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main (void)
{
printf ("%d\n", (INT_MAX+1) < 0);
return 0;
}
The program is asking the C implementation to answer a simple question: if we add one to the largest representable integer, is the result negative? This is perfectly legal behavior for a C implementation:
$ cc test.c -o test
$ ./test
1
So is this:
$ cc test.c -o test
$ ./test
0
And this:
$ cc test.c -o test
$ ./test
42
And this:
$ cc test.c -o test
$ ./test
Formatting root partition, chomp chomp
One might say: Some of these compilers are behaving improperly because the C standard says a relational operator must return 0 or 1. But since the program has no meaning at all, the implementation can do whatever it likes. Undefined behavior trumps all other behaviors of the C abstract machine.
Will a real compiler emit code to chomp your disk? Of course not, but keep in mind that practically speaking, undefined behavior often does lead to Bad Things because many security vulnerabilities start out as memory or integer operations that have undefined behavior. For example, accessing an out of bounds array element is a key part of the canonical stack smashing attack. In summary: the compiler does not need to emit code to format your disk. Rather, following the OOB array access your computer will begin executing exploit code, and that code is what will format your disk.
No Traveling
It is very common for people to say — or at least think — something like this:
The x86 ADD instruction is used to implement C’s signed add operation, and it has two’s complement behavior when the result overflows. I’m developing for an x86 platform, so I should be able to expect two’s complement semantics when 32-bit signed integers overflow.
THIS IS WRONG. You are saying something like this:
Somebody once told me that in basketball you can’t hold the ball and run. I got a basketball and tried it and it worked just fine. He obviously didn’t understand basketball.
(This explanation is due to Roger Miller via Steve Summit.)
Of course it is physically possible to pick up a basketball and run with it. It is also possible you will get away with it during a game. However, it is against the rules; good players won’t do it and bad players won’t get away with it for long. Evaluating (INT_MAX+1) in C or C++ is exactly the same: it may work sometimes, but don’t expect to keep getting away with it. The situation is actually a bit subtle so let’s look in more detail.
First, are there C implementations that guarantee two’s complement behavior when a signed integer overflows? Of course there are. Many compilers will have this behavior when optimizations are turned off, for example, and GCC has an option (-fwrapv) for enforcing this behavior at all optimization levels. Other compilers will have this behavior at all optimization levels by default.
There are also, it should go without saying, compilers that do not have two’s complement behavior for signed overflows. Moreover, there are compilers (like GCC) where integer overflow behaved a certain way for many years and then at some point the optimizer got just a little bit smarter and integer overflows suddenly and silently stopped working as expected. This is perfectly OK as far as the standard goes. While it may be unfriendly to developers, it would be considered a win by the compiler team because it will increase benchmark scores.
In summary: There’s nothing inherently bad about running with a ball in your hands and also there’s nothing inherently bad about shifting a 32-bit number by 33 bit positions. But one is against the rules of basketball and the other is against the rules of C and C++. In both cases, the people designing the game have created arbitrary rules and we either have to play by them or else find a game we like better.
Why Is Undefined Behavior Good?
The good thing — the only good thing! — about undefined behavior in C/C++ is that it simplifies the compiler’s job, making it possible to generate very efficient code in certain situations. Usually these situations involve tight loops. For example, high-performance array code doesn’t need to perform bounds checks, avoiding the need for tricky optimization passes to hoist these checks outside of loops. Similarly, when compiling a loop that increments a signed integer, the C compiler does not need to worry about the case where the variable overflows and becomes negative: this facilitates several loop optimizations. I’ve heard that certain tight loops speed up by 30%-50% when the compiler is permitted to take advantage of the undefined nature of signed overflow. Similarly, there have been C compilers that optionally give undefined semantics to unsigned overflow to speed up other loops.
Why Is Undefined Behavior Bad?
When programmers cannot be trusted to reliably avoid undefined behavior, we end up with programs that silently misbehave. This has turned out to be a really bad problem for codes like web servers and web browsers that deal with hostile data because these programs end up being compromised and running code that arrived over the wire. In many cases, we don’t actually need the performance gained by exploitation of undefined behavior, but due to legacy code and legacy toolchains, we’re stuck with the nasty consequences.
A less serious problem, more of an annoyance, is where behavior is undefined in cases where all it does is make the compiler writer’s job a bit easier, and no performance is gained. For example a C implementation has undefined behavior when:
An unmatched ‘ or ” character is encountered on a logical source line during tokenization.
With all due respect to the C standard committee, this is just lazy. Would it really impose an undue burden on C implementors to require that they emit a compile-time error message when quote marks are unmatched? Even a 30 year-old (at the time C99 was standardized) systems programming language can do better than this. One suspects that the C standard body simply got used to throwing behaviors into the “undefined” bucket and got a little carried away. Actually, since the C99 standard lists 191 different kinds of undefined behavior, it’s fair to say they got a lot carried away.
Understanding the Compiler’s View of Undefined Behavior
The key insight behind designing a programming language with undefined behavior is that the compiler is only obligated to consider cases where the behavior is defined. We’ll now explore the implications of this.
If we imagine a C program being executed by the C abstract machine, undefined behavior is very easy to understand: each operation performed by the program is either defined or undefined, and usually it’s pretty clear which is which. Undefined behavior becomes difficult to deal with when we start being concerned with all possible executions of a program. Application developers, who need code to be correct in every situation, care about this, and so do compiler developers, who need to emit machine code that is correct over all possible executions.
Talking about all possible executions of a program is a little tricky, so let’s make a few simplifying assumptions. First, we’ll discuss a single C/C++ function instead of an entire program. Second, we’ll assume that the function terminates for every input. Third, we’ll assume the function’s execution is deterministic; for example, it’s not cooperating with other threads via shared memory. Finally, we’ll pretend that we have infinite computing resources, making it possible to exhaustively test the function. Exhaustive testing means that all possible inputs are tried, whether they come from arguments, global variables, file I/O, or whatever.
The exhaustive testing algorithm is simple:
- Compute next input, terminating if we’ve tried them all
- Using this input, run the function in the C abstract machine, keeping track of whether any operation with undefined behavior was executed
- Go to step 1
Enumerating all inputs is not too difficult. Starting with the smallest input (measured in bits) that the function accepts, try all possible bit patterns of that size. Then move to the next size. This process may or may not terminate but it doesn’t matter since we have infinite computing resources.
For programs that contain unspecified and implementation-defined behaviors, each input may result in several or many possible executions. This doesn’t fundamentally complicate the situation.
OK, what has our thought experiment accomplished? We now know, for our function, which of these categories it falls into:
- Type 1: Behavior is defined for all inputs
- Type 2: Behavior is defined for some inputs and undefined for others
- Type 3: Behavior is undefined for all inputs
Type 1 Functions
These have no restrictions on their inputs: they behave well for all possible inputs (of course, “behaving well” may include returning an error code). Generally, API-level functions and functions that deal with unsanitized data should be Type 1. For example, here’s a utility function for performing integer division without executing undefined behaviors:
int32_t safe_div_int32_t (int32_t a, int32_t b) {
if ((b == 0) || ((a == INT32_MIN) && (b == -1))) {
report_integer_math_error();
return 0;
} else {
return a / b;
}
}Since Type 1 functions never execute operations with undefined behavior, the compiler is obligated to generate code that does something sensible regardless of the function’s inputs. We don’t need to consider these functions any further.
Type 3 Functions
These functions admit no well-defined executions. They are, strictly speaking, completely meaningless: the compiler is not even obligated to generate even a return instruction. Do Type 3 functions really exist? Yes, and in fact they are common. For example, a function that — regardless of input — uses a variable without initializing it is easy to unintentionally write. Compilers are getting smarter and smarter about recognizing and exploiting this kind of code. Here’s a great example from the Google Native Client project:
When returning from trusted to untrusted code, we must sanitize the return address before taking it. This ensures that untrusted code cannot use the syscall interface to vector execution to an arbitrary address. This role is entrusted to the function NaClSandboxAddr, in sel_ldr.h. Unfortunately, since r572, this function has been a no-op on x86.
-- What happened?
During a routine refactoring, code that once read
aligned_tramp_ret = tramp_ret & ~(nap->align_boundary - 1);
was changed to read
return addr & ~(uintptr_t)((1 << nap->align_boundary) - 1);
Besides the variable renames (which were intentional and correct), a shift was introduced, treating nap->align_boundary as the log2 of bundle size.
We didn't notice this because NaCl on x86 uses a 32-byte bundle size. On x86 with gcc, (1 << 32) == 1. (I believe the standard leaves this behavior undefined, but I'm rusty.) Thus, the entire sandboxing sequence became a no-op.
This change had four listed reviewers and was explicitly LGTM'd by two. Nobody appears to have noticed the change.
-- Impact
There is a potential for untrusted code on 32-bit x86 to unalign its instruction stream by constructing a return address and making a syscall. This could subvert the validator. A similar vulnerability may affect x86- 64.
ARM is not affected for historical reasons: the ARM implementation masks the untrusted return address using a different method.
What happened? A simple refactoring put the function containing this code into Type 3. The person who sent this message believes that x86-gcc evaluates (1<<32) to 1, but there’s no reason to expect this behavior to be reliable (in fact it is not on a few versions of x86-gcc that I tried). This construct is definitely undefined and of course the compiler can do done anything it wants. As is typical for a C compiler, it chose to simply not emit the instructions corresponding to the undefined operation. (A C compiler’s #1 goal is to emit efficient code.) Once the Google programmers gave the compiler the license to kill, it went ahead and killed. One might ask: Wouldn’t it be great if the compiler provided a warning or something when it detected a Type 3 function? Sure! But that is not the compiler’s priority.
The Native Client example is a good one because it illustrates how competent programmers can be suckered in by an optimizing compiler’s underhanded way of exploiting undefined behavior. A compiler that is very smart at recognizing and silently destroying Type 3 functions becomes effectively evil, from the developer’s point of view.
Type 2 Functions
These have behavior that is defined for some inputs and undefined for others. This is the most interesting case for our purposes. Signed integer divide makes a good example:
int32_t unsafe_div_int32_t (int32_t a, int32_t b) {
return a / b;
}This function has a precondition; it should only be called with arguments that satisfy this predicate:
(b != 0) && (!((a == INT32_MIN) && (b == -1)))
Of course it’s no coincidence that this predicate looks a lot like the test in the Type 1 version of this function. If you, the caller, violate this precondition, your program’s meaning will be destroyed. Is it OK to write functions like this, that have non-trivial preconditions? In general, for internal utility functions this is perfectly OK as long as the precondition is clearly documented.
Now let’s look at the compiler’s job when translating this function into object code. The compiler performs a case analysis:
- Case 1: (b != 0) && (!((a == INT32_MIN) && (b == -1)))
Behavior of / operator is defined → Compiler is obligated to emit code computing a / b
- Case 2: (b == 0) || ((a == INT32_MIN) && (b == -1))
Behavior of / operator is undefined → Compiler has no particular obligations
Now the compiler writers ask themselves the question: What is the most efficient implementation of these two cases? Since Case 2 incurs no obligations, the simplest thing is to simply not consider it. The compiler can emit code only for Case 1.
A Java compiler, in contrast, has obligations in Case 2 and must deal with it (though in this particular case, it is likely that there won’t be runtime overhead since processors can usually provide trapping behavior for integer divide by zero).
Let’s look at another Type 2 function:
int stupid (int a) {
return (a+1) > a;
}The precondition for avoiding undefined behavior is:
(a != INT_MAX)
Here the case analysis done by an optimizing C or C++ compiler is:
- Case 1: a != INT_MAX
Behavior of + is defined → Computer is obligated to return 1
- Case 2: a == INT_MAX
Behavior of + is undefined → Compiler has no particular obligations
Again, Case 2 is degenerate and disappears from the compiler’s reasoning. Case 1 is all that matters. Thus, a good x86-64 compiler will emit:
stupid:
movl $1, %eax
ret
If we use the -fwrapv flag to tell GCC that integer overflow has two’s complement behavior, we get a different case analysis:
- Case 1: a != INT_MAX
Behavior is defined → Computer is obligated to return 1
- Case 2: a == INT_MAX
Behavior is defined → Compiler is obligated to return 0
Here the cases cannot be collapsed and the compiler is obligated to actually perform the addition and check its result:
stupid:
leal 1(%rdi), %eax
cmpl %edi, %eax
setg %al
movzbl %al, %eax
ret
Similarly, an ahead-of-time Java compiler also has to perform the addition because Java mandates two’s complement behavior when a signed integer overflows (I’m using GCJ for x86-64):
_ZN13HelloWorldApp6stupidEJbii:
leal 1(%rsi), %eax
cmpl %eax, %esi
setl %al
ret
This case-collapsing view of undefined behavior provides a powerful way to explain how compilers really work. Remember, their main goal is to give you fast code that obeys the letter of the law, so they will attempt to forget about undefined behavior as fast as possible, without telling you that this happened.
A Fun Case Analysis
About a year ago, the Linux kernel started using a special GCC flag to tell the compiler to avoid optimizing away useless null-pointer checks. The code that caused developers to add this flag looks like this (I’ve cleaned up the example just a bit):
static void __devexit agnx_pci_remove (struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
struct ieee80211_hw *dev = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
struct agnx_priv *priv = dev->priv;
if (!dev) return;
... do stuff using dev ...
}
The idiom here is to get a pointer to a device struct, test it for null, and then use it. But there’s a problem! In this function, the pointer is dereferenced before the null check. This leads an optimizing compiler (for example, gcc at -O2 or higher) to perform the following case analysis:
- Case 1: dev == NULL
“dev->priv” has undefined behavior → Compiler has no particular obligations
- Case 2: dev != NULL
Null pointer check won’t fail → Null pointer check is dead code and may be deleted
As we can now easily see, neither case necessitates a null pointer check. The check is removed, potentially creating an exploitable security vulnerability.
Of course the problem is the use-before-check of pci_get_drvdata()’s return value, and this has to be fixed by moving the use after the check. But until all such code can be inspected (manually or by a tool), it was deemed safer to just tell the compiler to be a bit conservative. The loss of efficiency due to a predictable branch like this is totally negligible. Similar code has been found in other parts of the kernel.
Living with Undefined Behavior
In the long run, unsafe programming languages will not be used by mainstream developers, but rather reserved for situations where high performance and a low resource footprint are critical. In the meantime, dealing with undefined behavior is not totally straightforward and a patchwork approach seems to be best:
- Enable and heed compiler warnings, preferably using multiple compilers
- Use static analyzers (like Clang’s, Coverity, etc.) to get even more warnings
- Use compiler-supported dynamic checks; for example, gcc’s -ftrapv flag generates code to trap signed integer overflows
- Use tools like Valgrind to get additional dynamic checks
- When functions are “type 2″ as categorized above, document their preconditions and postconditions
- Use assertions to verify that functions’ preconditions are postconditions actually hold
- Particularly in C++, use high-quality data structure libraries
Basically: be very careful, use good tools, and hope for the best.
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